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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**SPECIAL FORCES AND THE ART OF INFLUENCE: A  
GRASSROOTS APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ENVIRONMENT**

by

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June 2006

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**SPECIAL FORCES AND THE ART OF INFLUENCE: A GRASSROOTS  
APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN AN  
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ENVIRONMENT**

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requirements for the degree of

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis researches the intricacies of the art of influence in an unconventional warfare environment to develop a model of influence that can be utilized by Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare. The research was based on several premises: (1) the strategic utility of Special Forces (SF) lies in its ability to influence a target audience in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment; (2) the nature of UW necessitates a bottom up and non-kinetic approach to influence in order to have lasting effective results.

Chapter II focuses on the elements of influence derived from the academic literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social psychology. Chapter III examines key elements of influence derived from the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence identified in prior chapters, to develop a new grassroots influence model

The results of the research are eight principles of grassroots psychological operations. The GRP model is intended to work in conjunction with or in support of other models that encompass the entire spectrum of activities in an UW conflict.



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Joel



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# **I. INTRODUCTION: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL FORCES**

Unconventional scenarios place a premium on non-kinetic forms of influence...Influence cannot be achieved without a comprehensive understanding of the cultural context in which the operations are planned.<sup>1</sup>

## **A. STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL FORCES**

The strategic utility of Special Forces (SF) lies in their ability to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and behavior of a target audience in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment, where the ability to influence populations is critical to accomplishing tactical and operational objectives. To appreciate the strategic utility of SF, consider the following: unconventional warfare is a distinct type of conflict, rather than simply a form of warfare on a spectrum of low intensity and high intensity conflict whose polar opposite is conventional warfare.<sup>2</sup> The relevance of this point is that the intensity spectrum of conflict implies that the same force can be used to accomplish a mission, utilizing differing tactics appropriate for the intensity level of the particular conflict. However, the vastly different characteristics of conventional and unconventional warfare suggest the need for a separate force whose focus is on one or the other type of warfare.

Conventional warfare is commonly defined as a form of warfare between two or more states whose forces are well defined. The primary purpose of conventional warfare is to defeat the opponent's military forces. As characterized by the Trinitarian model of war, conventional warfare is managed by the state, executed by established armed forces (field armies), and the people (civilians) are not involved. On the other hand, unconventional warfare is commonly defined as war between a state and a non-state actor, characterized by an asymmetrical material resource advantage for the state and an

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<sup>1</sup> "Creating Stability in an Unstable World," Irregular Warfare II Conference Report, General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico VA, July 11-12, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick's Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005

asymmetrical information advantage for the non-state actors.<sup>3</sup> In UW the people (civilians) become the center of gravity because they provide the non-state actors with the information advantage through passive or active support. A primary focus for UW is controlling the population. Therefore, UW requires a distinctly different force trained in the elements of UW.

Because of the different characteristics of UW and conventional warfare, utilizing a conventional force, whose primary focus is the destruction of the opponent's military force and who are not specifically trained in the elements of UW, would prove inefficient in an UW conflict. As Alfred H. Paddock suggests, "Regular divisions were never designed or equipped for unconventional warfare, so special units, training, and doctrine would be necessary for such a task."<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, as the quote at the beginning of this chapter states, unconventional scenarios place a premium on non-kinetic forms of influence. The validity of this statement can be attributed to the increased involvement and role of the civilian population in an UW environment as compared to conventional warfare.

## **B. THE NATURE OF UW**

Controlling the population is the critical factor in an unconventional warfare environment. The most significant advantage enjoyed by opponents of the state in this environment is the information advantage, which is derived from the ability to control a population and subsequently secure support. The information advantage provides a cloak of invisibility for the insurgents which allows them to attack when and where it is most beneficial to their objectives and survivability. Without the protection and support provided by the controlled population, an opponent with superior technology and resources could easily find, fix, and defeat the resource inferior insurgent force.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, success in an UW environment requires the ability to control the population. The methods and techniques used to control a target audience can be categorized as either force (kinetic) or persuasion (non-kinetic), with each possessing its

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<sup>3</sup> Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick's Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005

<sup>4</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. *US Army Special Warfare: Its origins*. (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1982), 1.

<sup>5</sup> Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick's Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005

distinct characteristics. This research focuses on a non-kinetic, grassroots approach to controlling a target audience through the art of influence. There are two important reasons for the non-kinetic focus here. First, the military in general is well versed in and predisposed to use kinetic means of control. Second, it may be assumed that non-kinetic means of influence will have longer lasting effects and are less likely to produce blowback.

Persuasive, non-kinetic, forms of control can be classified as psychological operations.<sup>6</sup> Although psychological operations (PSYOP) units can work in support of Special Forces in a UW environment, the primary facilitator of the grassroots psychological operations will be SF. The reason for this is because SF habitually operates within the UW environment through day to day contact with the indigenous population. Therefore, they are in a position to have the greatest psychological impact on the target audiences (TA). Furthermore, SF has an historical connection, from its inception, with psychological operations.

### **C. THE SPECIAL FORCES AND PSYOP CONNECTION**

In WWII the United States realized that it needed the ability to undermine the enemy's will to fight using psychological techniques.<sup>7</sup> The historical link between special operations and psychological warfare can be traced back to the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and its first director Colonel William J. Donovan. Donovan's concept of psychological operations included several stages: the first being "intelligence penetration," the next being intelligence gathering for strategic planning and propaganda, and the last phase being special operations such as sabotage and subversions, followed by unconventional guerilla tactics and actions and behind-the-lines resistance movements.<sup>8</sup> This, in short, defines how special operations, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations have been linked together from

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<sup>6</sup> FM 3-05.301 Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures December 2003, 1-1: "PSYOP—are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."

<sup>7</sup> 11 July 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the office of Coordinator of Information (COI)...the United States began its first organized venture into the fields of espionage, propaganda, subversion and related activities. (Paddock,1982)

<sup>8</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. *US Army Special Warfare: Its origins*. (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1982), 5.

their inception. The strategic utility of special operations is linked to the use of unconventional methods to produce a psychological effect on enemies, neutrals, and friendly forces. Given the strategic utility of SF, the nature of UW, and the historical link between SF and psychological operations, an in-depth look at the underlying conditions of the art of influence and the development of a grassroots psychological operations model is relevant to Special Forces and the current environment of conflict.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

**Hypothesis**—The strategic utility of Special Forces lies in their ability to achieve strategic affects through persuasion.

##### **Questions:**

- 1) What are the elements and techniques of successful persuasion operations?
- 2) What are the key elements of successful UW operations?
- 3) Can SF, in a UW environment, effectively influence a target audience to achieve mission objectives?

This thesis researches the elements of influence to develop a model of influence that can be utilized by Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare. The methodology is as follows:

- 1) A review of the academic literature on the elements of influence and cognitive and social psychology.
- 2) A presentation of two case studies of unconventional warfare.
- 3) Development of grassroots influence model.

Chapter II focuses on the elements of influence derived from the academic literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social psychology. The third chapter examines key elements of UW derived from the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence identified in prior chapters, to develop a grassroots influence model. Chapter V concludes with a summary of the research findings, recommendations for applying the research, and suggestions for further research in this area.

## II. SURVEY OF INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES

Capture their minds and their hearts and souls will follow.<sup>9</sup>

This chapter surveys the research in cognitive and social psychology on techniques and principles for influencing human behavior. The purpose is to establish a scientific foundation for exerting influence in the unconventional warfare environment by small, specially trained forces.

The chapter is based on two assumptions. The first is that the techniques to influence individual people to act can also be used to influence the masses. The second assumption is that influence techniques which are effective in one environment can be successfully employed in distinctly different environments. Accordingly, the chapter describes key principles, parameters and techniques of influence from the academic, commercial and political arenas. The problem of influence is defined in the first section of the chapter. The second section covers the principles and techniques of the process of influencing individuals. The third section broadens the discussion from a focus on the individual to an examination of social networks, social movements, and social epidemics.

Analyzing the concepts and techniques of influence used in politics and the commercial industry is relevant to the unconventional warfare environment because they all have a common objective: influencing people to action. The purposes behind this objective vary. In the political arena, the purpose is winning votes; in the commercial sector, the purpose is making money. In the unconventional warfare environment, the purpose is to affect the legitimacy of an existing government. The ability to influence people is vital to success in all three environments. Whatever the purpose, some techniques and concepts transcend the differences in environments. This thesis asserts that in all three environments, truly effective influence campaigns start at the grassroots and are supported by continuous external, top-down mass media propaganda reinforcement. Former Speaker of the House Representatives Thomas “Tip” O’Neil famously said, “All politics is local.”<sup>10</sup> Unconventional warfare is local as well.

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<sup>9</sup> “Psychological Operations Quotes.” [Web site]; available from <http://www.psywarrior.com/quotes.html>; Internet; accessed 22 May 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas O’Neill and Gary Hymel (1994). *All Politics Is Local: And Other Rules of the Game*. Holbrook MA: Bob Adams Inc.

In both the unconventional and, increasingly, conventional warfare environments, the process of gaining a position of influence among the indigenous population is commonly referred to as “winning hearts and minds.” Developing a model to effectively address the “hearts and minds” problem requires first defining and analyzing the problem.

#### **A. THE PROBLEM OF HEARTS AND MINDS**

The hearts and minds problem can be defined simply. Because people have different frames of reference through which they view the world, winning indigenous people’s hearts and minds requires that one adjust, reshape, or mold (ARM) the perceptual framework so that the those indigenous views and actions are compatible with both short term tactical and long term strategic goals. A person’s mental frameworks—which defines someone as an individual and member of a community and affects how that person views the world—results from what a person does, which in turn is determined by where that person lives.<sup>11</sup> A person’s frame of reference is shaped by experience, teaching, and observations of one’s surroundings. More importantly, a person’s mental framework is developed primarily by those within his circle of influence. Each person’s framework is slightly different. The farther a person is from the center of another’s circle of influence, the more likely it is that their frameworks will be shaped differently.

Although people of different backgrounds and beliefs may have different frames of reference, there are core issues and concerns shared by all. This is demonstrated in the comments by Cragin and Gerwehr: “. . . Arabs, not unlike other people all over the world, are focused principally on matters of security, fulfillment and satisfaction. What matters most are the things that affect them most directly: the quality and the security of their daily work, their faith and their family.”<sup>12</sup> The issues and areas of concern that are not shared by all humans will be referred to as “areas of critical differences.” These areas, no matter how subtle or distinct the differences may be, must be ARMED to make the hearts and minds of one group compatible with the goals of another group. To effectively influence a person requires penetrating that individual’s circle of influence. This is the true problem of hearts and minds and the objective of grassroots psychological operations.

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<sup>11</sup> Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Anna Simons’ course on the Anthropology of Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence in the Struggle Against Terrorism*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 3.

## **B. PENETRATING THE CIRCLE OF INFLUENCE**

The circle of influence can be conceptualized as a series of concentric circles around a person. Each circle represents the level of influence exerted by outside sources on the individual. In “Information Wars: are the Iraqis Getting the Message?” Putman describes the circles of influence that most influence the Iraqi people: the Arab satellite television channels, people’s family, tribe and friends, the people on the streets, Islamic clerics, and the newspapers.<sup>13</sup> Putnam’s article argues that the American propaganda, used during the current war in Iraq, was not within the Iraqi people’s circle of influence and therefore the Iraqi people were not getting the American message.

The concentric model of the circle of influence used here is based on several conditions. First, in order to effectively influence a person or adjust, reshape or mold that person’s frame of reference, you must penetrate his circle of influence; the deeper the penetration the greater the likelihood of effective influence. Second, the further away one is from the center of an individual’s circle of influence, the greater the differences in the shape of the two frameworks. Accordingly, it will take greater effort to ARM the framework to make it compatible with short and long term goals. Finally, grassroots psychological operations are intended to operate within the innermost circles of influence, supported by propaganda and mass media at the intermediate levels of the circle of influence, and public diplomacy at the outermost level of the circle of influence.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Bill Putman, “Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message?” *Strategic Insights (Naval Postgraduate School)*, Vol. III, No. 12 (December 2004) [journal online]; available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/archiveDate.asp#vol3issue12>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2005

<sup>14</sup> Public Diplomacy is mostly effective with countries that are like minded and not predisposed to perceive the initiating country as hostile or lacking credibility in its true (vs. stated) intentions. In short, the cognitive biases of a target audience prevent public diplomacy from penetrating deep into the circle of influence. In the cold war PD played a significant but supporting role in the influence of the Soviet Block. Other techniques that target the desires of the people at a grassroots level might have had a greater impact than PD; even though PD, from an international stand point, had more visibility than grassroots forms of influence.






Figure 1. This is a typical example of the “Circles of Influence”—some people may have a different order or groups in their “circles.”

### C. TECHNIQUES FOR INFLUENCING INDIVIDUALS

Techniques for influencing individuals have been extensively studied and documented. This section describes several of the concepts most relevant for a hearts and minds mission.

#### 1. Six Principles of Influence

Robert Cialdini’s six principles of influence are useful for determining how to penetrate the innermost circles of influence and effectively ARM an individual’s framework. The principles result from the fact that humans develop automatic responses and shortcuts for dealing with the overwhelming, extraordinarily complicated and rapidly changing stimuli in the environment. Although automatic responses may not always produce the best or most accurate response, they are invaluable for helping people comprehend and effectively negotiate everyday life. An example of a shortcut is the simple maxim often used when calculating value: “An expensive price tag denotes good quality.”<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Morrow, 1993).

Even though shortcuts and automatic responses are necessary and most of the time effective, they can be exploited by people who thoroughly understand the underlying principles of automatic responses. Cialdini categorizes these principles as six different social and psychological weapons of influence: reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority and scarcity.

Reciprocity is based on the simple notion that “We should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”<sup>16</sup> If I buy you a coke you should repay me with something equivalent. This seemingly obvious and simple principle is valuable in three respects. It has the power to induce repayment, it bestows a deep sense of obligation to repay an unwanted debt, and it can induce repayment far greater than the initial deed. Reciprocity transcends any social, economic, or cultural barrier. As Gouldner notes in *Influence*, “There is no human society that does not subscribe to the rule.”<sup>17</sup>

Commitment and consistency involve the idea that “Once we have made a choice or taken a stand, we encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment.”<sup>18</sup> Arguably the most effective weapon of influence is the individual’s need to be consistent or appear consistent to others. This need creates opportunities for compliance professionals to influence an individual to act in ways that are not in his or her self-interest. Consistency is valued and respected in most circumstances and underlies the rational actor model.<sup>19</sup> At a strategic level, commitment and consistency are exploited in many ways. For example, U.S. policy against “negotiating with terrorists” has forced the government to use back door negotiation or forgo opportunities to resolve hostage situations. A useful benefit of the commitment and consistency principle is that it produces inner change. There is less need to apply pressure on individuals who have made a commitment because they have internalized motivations to be consistent with their commitment. Even more telling is the fact that people will develop their own reasons for being consistent in their decisions, even if the initial reason for making the commitment is no longer present.

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<sup>16</sup> Cialdini, 17.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>19</sup> The rational actor model is one of models used to explain the government decision making process in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999). The model characterizes the government as a unitary element making decisions based on logic and reason with an inherent need to act consistently with previous commitments.

Social proof is based on a simple fact: “One means we use to determine what is correct is to determine what other people think is correct...we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.”<sup>20</sup> An example of the social proof principle is the Broken Window theory.<sup>21</sup> According to the theory, if a broken window is left unfixed, then breaking windows becomes an acceptable behavior; if someone is observed breaking a window and receives no punishment, breaking windows becomes an acceptable behavior and the number of broken windows will continue to increase until social proof says “stop.” In short, if others are partaking in a given action then that action becomes socially acceptable. The social proof principle seems simple to implement—just get a few people to the altar and others will follow. However, with this particular weapon of influence, the condition and timing of implementation can make a significant difference in the outcome. Social proof is most effective in times of uncertainty and confusion.<sup>22</sup>

Liking is a weapon of influence because people “prefer to say yes to the request of someone we know and like.”<sup>23</sup> It is used by many of the “social salesmen” who sell products, such as kitchenware, in home parties. Social salesmen thrive on social connections and friendships to move products. This weapon of influence may involve several different categories of “liking,” including physical attractiveness, similarity, and so on. Probably the most important, at least in the initial stages of unconventional warfare, is similarity.<sup>24</sup> People are more likely to respond to others who look like them, dress like them, act like them and have similar beliefs. In the context of circles of influence, liking is found in the circles closest to the center. To use liking as a source of influence, agents must establish some commonality, physical or mental, with the target audience.

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<sup>20</sup> Cialdini, 116.

<sup>21</sup> James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Security” *Manhattan Institute for Policy Research* [journal online]; available from [http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/\\_atlantic\\_monthly-broken\\_windows.pdf](http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 April 2006

<sup>22</sup> Cialdini, 129.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 167.

<sup>24</sup> This is most likely because first impressions are usually based on similarity. How much a stranger looks like, thinks like, or acts like the target audience plays a big part in getting a foot in the door. After getting in the door, the stranger might establish credibility or demonstrate some sort of authority that changes how they are perceived.

Authority is “a deep-seated sense of duty to authority [that] is within us all.”<sup>25</sup> A deep sense of duty will practically ensure obedience, regardless of the validity, importance, or righteousness of the task. Authority figures are seen as having greater wisdom or greater control over rewards and punishments. Listening to someone with more wisdom and more control only makes sense; it leads to automatic obedience to authority.

In the unconventional warfare environment, it is necessary to differentiate between two categories of authority. The first is righteous authority, which is defined here as authority based on wisdom and a sovereign right to position. The second is power authority, which is based on control of resources and the ability to coerce action through their allocation as reward or punishment. These two types of authority often coexist and are mutually supporting. The key to successful influence is determining which type of authority is most important to the target population. If power authority is dominant, it implies the use of coercion and force to influence and control the people. Coercion and force require more resources and are susceptible to resentment and backlash. In contrast, when righteous authority is dominant, it implies a sovereign right to govern and the use of non-kinetic influence measures to control the people. Righteous authority uses fewer resources and is more likely to enlist the support of the people. In an unconventional warfare environment, power authority plays a significant role in gaining relative superiority. For outsiders in a hostile or potentially hostile environment, power may be the only authority initially recognized by the indigenous people. However, it is important to make a transition from power authority to righteous authority as soon as possible, because power authority can create backlash or adversely affect the mission to win hearts and minds in support of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

Lastly, scarcity is a weapon of influence because “opportunities seem more valuable when their availability is limited.”<sup>26</sup> Scarcity is effective in influencing people because of the idea of loss. People are more likely to avoid loss than to take a risk to gain something, even when the potential loss and the potential gain are equally valuable. Supporting this argument is Prospect Theory, which argues that individuals tend to be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Cialdini, 213.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 238.

<sup>27</sup> Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 4.

Part of what determines whether a situation is considered to involve “gains” or “losses” depends on how the options are “framed” or presented, a subject that has been addressed by various authors, including Anthony Pratkanis in his discussion of various techniques for influencing people.

## **2. Four Categories of Influence Techniques**

Pratkanis presents four categories of influence techniques, including what he defines as “landscaping” or pre-persuasion techniques.<sup>28</sup> In “107 Influence Techniques,” he notes that his influence techniques are one level below Cialdini’s six weapons of influence. This thesis does not require examination of all 107 techniques, but instead describes the four general categories which encompass those techniques.

The four categories Pratkanis discusses are based on a communicator’s four main tasks as described in classical rhetoric theory: establish a favorable climate for the influence attempt, create a relationship with the audience, present the message in a convincing fashion, and use the emotions to persuade.<sup>29</sup>

Establishing a favorable climate for the influence attempt is also called “landscaping” or pre-persuasion in Pratkanis’s work. Landscaping is defined as “Structuring the situation in such a way that the target is likely to be receptive to a given course of action and respond in a desired manner.”<sup>30</sup> Pre-persuasion is defined as “The process of taking control of a situation to establish a favorable climate for influence.”<sup>31</sup> Landscaping and pre-persuasion can play a critical part in determining the outcome of an influence attempt. The probability of success is directly related to the ability to landscape; a person with the ability to landscape effectively is most likely to influence the target audience. Some of the techniques for landscaping include defining the issue in a favorable manner, limiting and controlling the number of choices and options, and creating a mutual interdependence.

Influence is also increased if the person can create a relationship with the audience and “source credibility.” Pratkanis writes, “Research has shown that what is important for influence is the establishment of social relationships that facilitate influence

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<sup>28</sup> A. R. Pratkanis, “Social influence analysis: An Index of Tactics,” in A. R. Pratkanis, ed., *The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress* (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, forthcoming)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 6.

between the source and target of influence.”<sup>32</sup> Source credibility is closely related to the concept of liking. This category is based on the target audience’s presumption of the influencer’s expertise and trustworthiness. Techniques in this category include taking the role of an authority figure, expert or even the common man. Exploiting social norms, utilizing the bandwagon approach and social reinforcement are other techniques to establish credibility. As with the concept of social proof, the credibility of the source is enhanced if it appears that everyone is doing the same thing.

The most important part of the influence process is the message, regardless of the techniques used to influence an individual or group. Pratkanis states, “An effective persuasive message is one that focuses the targets’ attention and cognitive activity on exactly what the communicator wants them to think about.”<sup>33</sup> The message delivers the intended action to be taken by the target audience. If the target audience misinterprets the message or does not accept it, then the intended outcome may not be achieved. A message that speaks to the target audience in a way to which the target audience can relate to is essential. There are a variety of techniques for presenting the message in a convincing fashion. Importantly, to get the desired effect, it may be necessary to tailor the message specifically for individual people. Creating a tailored message for different audiences requires detailed information on each target audience. Basing the message on general information about a large and diverse population may result in a message that does not appeal to a significant portion of the target audience.

People are also subject to influence based on emotional appeals; emotion can be used to persuade. According to Pratkanis, “An emotional appeal is one that uses the message recipient’s subjective feelings, affect, arousal, emotions, and tension-states as the basis for securing influence.”<sup>34</sup> Some of the techniques that use emotion to persuade include appeals to fear, guilt, flattery, empathy, self-prophecy, and self-affirmation. Emotions are effective as an influence device because they are relatively easy to create and marshal in any given influence situation, and because once aroused, emotions can be used as a platform for promoting and securing influence and compliance. War itself can

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<sup>32</sup> Pratkanis, 18.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 43

induce and evoke a plethora of feelings that span the human emotional spectrum. Unconventional warfare adds the element of uncertainty to an already emotionally sensitive state.

### **3. Overcoming Audience Immunity to Persuasion**

*The Persuaders* is a documentary produced by PBS that investigates what correspondent Douglas Rushkoff calls the “persuasion industry.”<sup>35</sup> The persuasion industry consists of commercial advertising agencies, politicians, social psychologists, and anyone involved in the process selling a product, service, candidate or an idea. The documentary provides a few specified and implied techniques of persuasion that might prove helpful for understanding psychological operations in an unconventional warfare environment.

According to *The Persuaders*, the persuasion industry today must deal head-on with the problem of clutter. Clutter refers to people getting so bombarded with advertising and solicitations that they become immune to the messages. Naomi Klein suggests that “consumers are like roaches. You spray them and spray them and after a while, it doesn’t work anymore. We develop immunities.”<sup>36</sup> With clutter (and the consequent immunity) defined as the primary problem of the persuasion industry, the documentary investigates ways to break through the clutter, just as this thesis investigates ways to penetrate the circle of influence.

Information is the key to overcoming the immunity of a target audience, as the documentary notes. The need for information in commercial markets has direct application to the need for information in the unconventional warfare environment. Market research in the commercial sector is the functional equivalent to intelligence gathering in the military context. Most important is the need for the right information, information gathered on the target audience. Not once did *The Persuaders* documentary show an advertising specialist, psychologist, or influence agent allude to gathering information on the competitors; they focused instead on how millions of dollars are spent

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<sup>35</sup> Barak Goodman and Douglas Rushkoff, transcript of the documentary *The Persuaders* (2005), Frontline PBS. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/etc/script.html> Accessed 15 February 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 1.

to gather information on the target audience. Commercial firms defeat their competitors indirectly, by winning the hearts and minds of consumers.

Advertising expert David Atkins suggests that people join cults and choose brand-name products for the same reason. “They need to belong and they want [their lives to have a greater purpose] to make meaning. We need to figure out what the world is all about, and we need the company of others.”<sup>37</sup> Clotaire Rapaille, a market research specialist, believes that people’s explanations of their own behavior are merely rationalizations created to make sense of behavior that is motivated by unconscious needs and impulses. Rapaille emphasizes that each individual has a simple code, a reptilian hot button, which determines their decisions.<sup>38</sup> Understanding the different codes is essential if one wants to push the reptilian hot button.

Market researcher Frank Luntz believes that “it doesn’t matter what you want to tell the public, it’s about what they want to hear.”<sup>39</sup> His technique is to take an issue and figure out what words would make that issue appealing to the target audience. *The Persuaders* notes that “Luntz’s specialty is testing language, finding words that work.”<sup>40</sup> He believes that it is more important to understand an individual’s feeling than it is to understand what they are thinking, as “Eighty percent of life is emotion and only twenty percent is intellect.”<sup>41</sup>

In the information gathering process, after the codes and the words that evoke emotions and feeling have been identified and determined, it is time to develop profiles for the target audience. Target audience profiles help determine the type and number of messages needed to move different parts of the target audience to the same collective action.

The answer to overcoming immunity is the tailored message, according to *The Persuaders*. For example, in the political arena the old idea of reaching voters one-on-one has reemerged as “narrow casting.” Politicians understand that they must appeal to several different demographics and that messages that appeal to one group of people that

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<sup>37</sup> Goodman, 8.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 27.



may not appeal to another. It is inevitable that a politician's constituents will have different frames of reference and varying views.

*The Persuaders* proposes that understanding the problem of clutter, the key importance of emotion and wording, and the tailored message and an answer to the problem moves everyone a step closer to understanding the art of persuasion. As Stuart Ewen suggests, "The secret of it all, the secret of all persuasion, is to induce the person to persuade himself."<sup>42</sup>

In summary, when considering the research on techniques for influencing individuals, the concepts of landscaping, liking, and message fit are among the reoccurring themes. The literature shows the individualistic nature of influence and the need to tailor the influence attempt to the target. Social networks and organizations and networks also play a role in the influence process; the literature on that subject is reviewed below.

#### **D. FROM INDIVIDUALS TO SOCIAL EPIDEMICS: THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS AND KEY INDIVIDUALS**

Much research on the importance of key individuals and social networks focuses on the political arena.

##### **1. Social Networks and Political Choices**

In "It's the Conversation Stupid: The Link between Social Interaction and Political Choice," Krebs argues for a more "social" image of choice, and especially political choice.<sup>43</sup> He suggests that a voter is not influenced only by information and opinions received directly from the media (the atomized voter). Nor is it accurate to rely on the idea of a particular demographic group as the main influence or predictor of a voter's choice (the demographic voter). Rather, Krebs says, voters are social (the social voter), and social networks exert a powerful influence on voting behavior. "Modern citizens do not make decisions in a social vacuum. Who we know influences what we know and how we feel about it."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Goodman, Barak and Douglas Rushkoff, transcript of the documentary *The Persuaders* (2005), Frontline PBS. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/etc/script.html> Accessed 15 February 2006.

<sup>43</sup> Valdis Krebs, ().<http://www.extremedemocracy.com/chapters/Chapter%20Nine-Krebs.pdf> 28 February 2006, 34

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 1.

The research conducted by Krebs alludes to how to effectively influence the masses. Trends in groups often start with one person taking a stand. Krebs's research demonstrates that in an election, a single person can influence as many as four others to turn out, creating a cascade effect on behalf of the initiator's candidate. As in the political realm, cascades and numbers are important in unconventional warfare. To the extent that more people support one side, there are fewer to support the other side. It is important to note that if the event that initiated the cascade began within a group that did not agree with the initiator, the cascade might favor the opposing candidate. In other words, a cascade may go in an unintended direction.

People more readily use information received from their networks. Krebs found the strongest influence from family, with additional influence exerted by neighbors and casual acquaintances (but no apparent influence by strangers on citizen choice in political matters).<sup>45</sup> Although groups influence the behavior of their members, key opinion leaders and experts, as well as those with connections to them, also hold the power to persuade, and this subject will be examined in depth later in this chapter.

Based on recent presidential campaign research, Krebs proposes five rules which here are given simple names so they can more easily be referred to later in this thesis.<sup>46</sup>

Rule 1. Take a stand and announce your plans. One can increase voter participation by announcing plans to vote. One must do this in a community that is predisposed to your candidate.

Rule 2. Neutral battleground. Find communities that do not have a majority for the other candidate. Build connections to undecided voters and those who support your view. Aim for one or more ties to all supporting your candidate.

Rule 3. Scan enemy territory for dissenters. Scan communities that have a majority for the other candidate in search of anyone supporting your candidate. Build at least one supporting tie to each person leaning towards your candidate.

Rule 4. Utilize your local reputation. If you are well integrated in your neighborhood and known for providing useful advice to neighbors, then consider talking to them about your candidate.

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<sup>45</sup> Krebs, 5.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 8.

Rule 5. Use the likeness and inner circle concepts. Unless they are public figures, strangers do not influence. Instead of having strangers call voters, or knock on doors, the campaign should find well-connected supporters and have them go out into their clusters (workplaces, places of worship, neighborhoods, sports leagues, etc.) building support for the candidate. Bringing masses of campaign workers who are strangers to contact local voters may cause more harm than good.

Krebs' rules may be useful in the UW environment in determining what areas to target first, as well as the types of individuals to look for in those areas.

## **2. Social Networks and Social Movements**

In "Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements"<sup>47</sup> Doug McAdam presents three common structural facts that influence the relationship between networks and social movements and elaborates on them in a way useful to those hoping to use the literature in an unconventional warfare setting.

The first common structural fact, simply stated, is that recruits to a social movement know others already involved. By providing prospective recruits with a mix of information and incentives, prior social ties encourage entrance into a movement. The second fact is that most social movements develop within an established setting, which provides insurgents with the resources to start and sustain collective action. The third fact is that emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction, because information, rendered credible by prior contact with the innovator, mediates the spread of a movement.<sup>48</sup> These facts are valuable information for an unconventional warfare environment, but McAdam's analysis provides a deeper understanding of the actual mechanism at work behind each fact.

The first fact is that recruits to a social movement tend to know others who are already involved. McAdams analysis focuses on the process of individual recruitment, which involves four conditions: the occurrence of a specific recruiting attempt, successful linkage of the movement and the recruit's sense of identity, support for that linkage from others who normally sustain the recruit's identity, and absence of strong

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<sup>47</sup> Doug McAdam, "Beyond Structural Analysis," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press 2003), 281-298.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 285.

opposition from others on whom the recruit's other salient identities depend (see Figure 2. below). In other words, a seemingly simple fact turns out to have important and contingent elements that could be manipulated by skilled operators in an unconventional warfare environment.

For example, a specific recruiting attempt may seem to be an obvious first step, but it is important to note that rarely do individuals approach a movement on their own accord. The linkage of movement and identity is important because once a person makes a commitment to who he wants to be—his identity—he will act consistent with that commitment. A person's identity is closely tied to those he knows, so support for the recruit's new identity works because individuals want their identity to reflect the identity of those they socialize with. People want approval and support from their social networks and if their social networks are involved in a social movement, they will join to maintain consistency with the group. The last aspect of the individual recruitment process is the absence of strong opposition from others who might affect an individual's sense of identity. In an unconventional warfare environment, there will naturally be strong opposition to the position or message being promoted by the opposition force/ insurgent group. The key is to recognize and isolate the target individual from opposing views. Recognizing the impact of opposition views on recruitment allows the recruiting group to prepare a counter in their own defense. McAdam suggests that the first three mechanisms may individually be effective recruitment tools but if done sequentially, and in the absence of negative influence, the likelihood of successful recruitment increases.




Figure 2. The Process of Individual Recruitment— Doug McAdam <sup>49</sup>

Similarly, McAdam’s analysis of the second fact, most social movements develop in an established setting, can be summarized by one succinct observation: “Bottom line: it is not prior ties or group structures that enable protest, but rather the interactive conversations that occur there and succeed in creating shared meanings and identities that legitimate emergent collective action.”<sup>50</sup> The results of McAdam’s analysis of the second structural fact focuses on the process of “emergent mobilization,” a three-stage process involving stages he labels attribution of threat or opportunity, social appropriation, and innovative contentious actions. Attribution of threat or opportunity is a “group level account of some new threat to, or opportunity for, the realization of group interests.” In other words, a group will mobilize for action when it is newly threatened or there is a new opportunity for gain. If the threat or opportunity is not new, the group has already adapted to the situation. As noted in the discussion of Prospect Theory, individuals tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking to avoid losses. Framing a situation as a threat to the group will mobilize them better than framing the situation as an opportunity. Social appropriation is the process by which an insurgent group takes over an existing organization and its collective identity; without an existing organization to appropriate, insurgents must create a new organization with a collective identity to supports the

<sup>49</sup> McAdam, 288. recreated

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 290.

movement's objectives. Finally, the concept of innovative contentious action is that once a movement has been mobilized, it must act in a contentious way to demonstrate a departure from normal behavior, to signal its change in identity and also to impose on the mobilized group the pressures of two weapons of influence, commitment and consistency. (See Figure 3)




Figure 3. The Process of Emergent Mobilization—Doug McAdam<sup>51</sup>

Finally, consider the third fact, that emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction. McAdam says, “The vast majority of contentious episodes never spread beyond the local settings in which they first develop.”<sup>52</sup> His analysis of this fact involves the concept of “scale shift,” defined as “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious action leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging the claims of their identities.”<sup>53</sup> Simply stated, more groups can relate with the identity of the initiating organization and coordinate their actions. Scale shift is a process that involves five stages: localized action, brokerage or diffusion, attribution of similarity, emulation, and coordinated action.

The process of scale shift begins only if there is localized action, a spark that sets things in motion. Localized action serves as a model for others. The next stage is brokerage and diffusion. Brokerage is like a salesman providing information or selling the idea of a localized action to someone previously unknown, while diffusion is akin to word of mouth where information is passed through already established ties. In the third stage, the attribution of similarity, actors in different sites identify themselves as being sufficiently similar as to justify common action. Regardless of location, if a person can

<sup>51</sup> McAdam, 291. recreated

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 293.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 293.

relate to another person's identity, it increases the likelihood of common action. Once the similarities have been established, the distant group will begin to emulate the group whose localized action initially sparked others' interest. The process is followed by coordinated action, as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. The Process of Scale Shift—Doug McAdam<sup>54</sup>

McAdam's analysis provides more in-depth understanding of social networks and social movements, which can aid in adapting to ever changing and unpredictable environments.

### **3. Social Epidemics: Key People, Memorable Messages, and the Importance of Context**

In an unconventional warfare environment it is not enough to simply induce localized action. The intent is to have the localized action supporting our objectives become contagious and spread across the entire operations area. It is the insurgent's intent to do the same. McAdams demonstrates that the process of scale shift spreads social action. This process can be elaborated in the context of social epidemics. In a

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<sup>54</sup> McAdam, 294, recreated

popular book by the same name, journalist Malcolm Gladwell<sup>55</sup> defines a “tipping point” as a moment of critical mass, a threshold, or a boiling point, but most importantly for this thesis, as the point when localized action bursts onto the large scale stage.<sup>56</sup> For the military, the tipping point might be associated with the decisive point in a battle when, before the end of the fighting, the battle was actually won or lost.

In an attempt to understand the mysteries of everyday changes, Gladwell summarizes studies of these events in the context of epidemics. He argues that every epidemic has a tipping point. Gladwell suggests that the research points to three rules of social epidemics which help frame the process of scale shift from a slightly different view point.<sup>57</sup>

The first rule, according to Gladwell, is the law of the few, which simply states that most of the work in epidemics is done by a small percentage of people. More importantly, it is the type of people who do the work that makes the difference in the spread of the epidemic. “Any kind of social epidemic is heavily dependent on the involvement of people with a particular and rare set of social gifts,”<sup>58</sup> Gladwell argues, labeling these people as connectors, mavens, and salesmen. The ideal situation would be to find a person who possesses characteristics of all three. Connectors have the special gift of bringing people together. Connectors socialize with a very diverse group and function well in any given setting. A connector has the ability to cross-fertilize groups with different perspectives. Mavens have the gift of information and are respected authority figures in their social networks. Those with persuasive skills Gladwell calls salesmen. They understand the subtle nuances involved with communication, can read and use body language, and understand the effects of emotion on individual decision making. Unlike connectors and mavens, there is science behind the salesman’s gift. Salesmen also rely heavily on their message, which is the essence of the second rule of social epidemics: the stickiness factor.

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<sup>55</sup> Gladwell is not a researcher; he’s a journalist summarizing other people’s research and this book is a piece of popularization, unlike, say, McAdam’s work.

<sup>56</sup> Malcolm Gladwell, *Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002), 12.

<sup>57</sup> Gladwell, 19.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 39.



The stickiness factor refers to how memorable the message is to the target audience and if it is memorable enough to move people to act. Gladwell argues that the stickiness factor of a message can be increased with simple and subtle yet significant changes. By paying “careful attention to the structure and format of your material, you can dramatically enhance the stickiness.”<sup>59</sup> As discussed earlier in this chapter, tailoring the message to the audience is an important factor in determining the outcome of an influence attempt.

According to Gladwell, the power of context means that “we are more than just sensitive to changes in context. We are exquisitely sensitive to them.”<sup>60</sup> In short, the environment affects the way we act. In this view, the power of context and the broken window theory are one and the same. “They are both based on the premise that an epidemic can be reversed, can be tipped, by tinkering with the smallest details of the immediate environment.”<sup>61</sup>

Gladwell’s three rules of epidemics suggest three main lessons. The first lesson is that a small group of people with certain skills can cause major changes. Second, a well crafted message is memorable and moves people to action. Finally, manipulating the situation or making small changes in the environment can dramatically affect the way people behave.

## **E. CONCLUSION**

The techniques and principles of influence discussed in this chapter will prove useful in the development of the grassroots PSYOP model. Both techniques of influencing individuals and the dynamics of social networks and epidemics will be apparent in the two case studies presented in the next chapter. An analysis of the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency will provide influence techniques and principles particular to the UW environment.

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<sup>59</sup>Gladwell, 99.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid, 140.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid, 146.

### **III. TWO CASE STUDIES OF INFLUENCE: THE PHILIPPINES 1946–1954 AND THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948–1960**

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he who enacts laws. President Abraham Lincoln

The elements of influence are an integral part of unconventional warfare. Depending on the situation, kinetic or non-kinetic means may be used to influence the target audience. But regardless of the situation, certain elements of influence have emerged in unconventional warfare. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key elements of influence. These elements form the basis of an influence model focused on non-kinetic means of influence. This chapter presents two cases in which influence principles and techniques were used by both the insurgent group and the counter-insurgent force. The general conditions of each case study are briefly described, followed by particular influence lessons from the case. The two case studies are the Huk rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency.

#### **A. THE PHILIPPINES 1946–1954**

The Huk rebellion can be categorized as a peasant revolt of an agrarian nature with origins in “a collection of vaguely Marxist labor groups, peasant organizations, and other groups which sought to unite against Japanese aggression in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on the Philippine Islands by Japanese troops.”<sup>62</sup> During Japanese occupation, the Peoples Army against the Japanese (the Huknong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon or Hukbalahap, known as the Huks) became the largest and most powerful resistance group on Luzon. After the liberation of the Philippines by American forces, the Huks continued to pursue their political agenda of land reform.

The underlying condition of the Philippine insurrection was land reform, “land for the landless.” The agrarian issues of the peasants were directly related to the class division in Philippine society. The upper class enjoyed privileges and rewards that were

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<sup>62</sup> L. E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986) 45.

not equally distributed to the peasants or workers. This system of class division did not reward hard work and more importantly did not provide opportunities for the majority of the youth.

The class division can be described as the land owners (landed aristocrats) versus the share tenants. The situation for the tenant was just one step above slavery. Although the standard agreement between the land owners and the tenants was a fifty-fifty division of the crops, in reality the tenant was irreversibly indebted to the land owner. The inequality in privileges and opportunities inevitably led to social unrest; all that was needed was a mechanism to coordinate a social movement or insurrection. Ultimately the Huks' organization, discipline, and their well-conceived plan—features that were clearly demonstrated and communicated—appealed more to the people than did the corrupt government.

The agents to coordinate the social movement came in two forms, communism and socialism, each of which promoted a system to remove both the class system and capitalism and create social equality. Agrarian unrest was common in Philippine history and the conditions for an insurrection were in place. Mobilization had begun prior to the Japanese occupation and the Philippine government was fully aware of the agrarian unrest. All that was needed was the key leadership to organize the movement. However, agrarian issues took a back seat to resisting the Japanese forces during the occupation.

The Huk leadership played a crucial part in the formation, rise, and fall of the agrarian insurrection. The leaders came from all walks of life, including labor leaders, well-educated men with poor backgrounds, and some of the top intellectuals in the country. Local leaders were responsible for knitting together local peasant groups and associations into larger and stronger peasant organizations. These local leaders were often the first to protest publicly against agrarian conditions and acted as the voices of the local peasants. The local leaders also shouldered the responsibilities of organizing collective action, from setting up meetings to arranging transportation for local groups. Working

without the benefit of mass media and mass public access to communication technologies, local leaders acted as links between groups and organizations in physically distant locations.<sup>63</sup>

One of the first advocates for the peasants and agrarian reform was Pedro Abad Santos. Santos was born to a well-to-do family; he was educated as a lawyer and became a skilled attorney. He first took up the peasants' interests after continual exposure to the aristocrats' injustices towards the peasants and workers. He began to provide legal council to peasant organizations and labor unions, which led to his involvement in the agrarian movement.<sup>64</sup> Another key insurrection leader was Luis Taruc, who became known as "El Supremo." Unlike Santos, Taruc was born to a poor family; however, he was educated and even received two years of pre-law training prior to becoming the Huks' leader and spokesman. He was popular with the peasants and led the insurrection until he surrendered in 1954.<sup>65</sup> Also critically important to the movement was Jose Lava, a graduate of the University of the Philippines and from a well-to-do family. Lava, also a lawyer, was thoroughly immersed in the teachings of Marxist Leninism. He was regarded as the intellectual leader of the Huks and was responsible for most of the education and training of the recruits, as well as developing Huk propaganda.<sup>66</sup> Although there were many other leaders and significant individuals in the Huk organization, the three mentioned here were most instrumental in the creation of the Huks and the rise and fall of the insurrection.

The original Huk organization was the wartime product of the merger of the Communist Peasant Union and the Socialist Peasant Union. Two core ideas linked the two organizations together: better conditions and pay for peasants and workers along with key concepts within socialism and communism, such as class struggle. The Social Peasants Union (AMT) was organized by Santos and Taruc prior to the establishment of the Communist Peasant Union (KPMP). The AMT began as a labor union attempting to secure better conditions and more pay for peasant workers. The AMT was believed to be

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<sup>63</sup> Benedict J Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977) 53.

<sup>64</sup> Kerkvliet, 52.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 80.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 220

the more aggressive of the two organizations, actively promoting class war. Crisanto Evagelista was a key leader in the KPMP, which was believed to be concerned more with the international aspects and proliferation of communism from Russia than with the concerns of local peasants and workers.<sup>67</sup> As a result, the communist party found most of its supporters amongst the bourgeoisie and alienated the majority of urban labor. So it was in the best interest of both organizations, and especially the KPMP, to merge and join forces in the agrarian revolt.

The Huks used a variety of tactics and techniques to recruit, gain support of the people, and grow the movement. In the face of an incompetent government response to the growing strength of the Huks, they garnered a significant amount of active and passive popular support. The Huks' main mantra—"land for the landless"—was one that all peasants and workers could relate to; it directly tied into the government's seeming lack of concern for the working class. However, "No single motive, not even the agrarian issue, accounts more than a small minority of those who joined the Huks."<sup>68</sup> A more likely explanation for the Huks' successful recruitment is the amount of control and authority that the Huks exerted over the barrios. Having control over the barrios and exercising authority judiciously within the barrios gave the Huks access to the people they were trying to influence.

In order to gain control of an area, the Huks would use open forum events to get their message out, while at the same time de-legitimizing the local and national governments. Even when the government began to refuse the Huks permits to host public events and rallies, the Huks found a way to "hijack" local government-sponsored events, by publicly asking the host questions revolving around the conditions of peasants and workers and then providing their own answers before the host had an opportunity to respond. These hijacking tactics proved very useful in getting the message to the people in a manner that embarrassed unprepared local officials.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society Revolt* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 100 Alfredo Saulo, former Education Department Chief, analysis of the Huk organization.

<sup>68</sup> Alvin H. Schaff *The Philippine Answer to Communism*. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 1955) 118.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

In the barrios, the Huks established themselves as the legitimate authority by protecting the people, collecting taxes, adjudicating offenses, and establishing schools and educational systems. If local government officials would not cooperate, at times the Huks would brand the officials as perpetrators of offenses against the people and would murder the officials in the name of justice. These actions lent the Huks the appearance of liberators. Once control was gained and authority established, the Huks co-opted local organizations and associations and used them to reinforce and spread the Huk message. The Huk resistance “secretly converted neighborhood associations into BUDC [Barrio United Defense Corps].”<sup>70</sup> A Huk party leader resided within these organizations and his job was to mold, shape and maneuver conversations so that they always ended up following the party line. The party members themselves were organized into groups of three to five people. These small cells created intensely loyal and self-abnegating individuals by making each party member bare his own weaknesses through self-criticism and point out flaws in other members.

The Huks had to rely on a variety of recruitment techniques to bolster their active rebel forces. Even with a message such as “land for the landless” and a movement based on the betterment of life for the peasants and workers, few people (about 11 percent<sup>71</sup>) sought to join the Huks or to provide active support to the rebels. The majority joined not out of concern for land reform issues. Rather, they joined to escape persecution by the government or because they had a grievance with the government over military back pay. The Huk recruitment concept was simple, with two phases. The first phase was contact by force, by accident, or by friendly association. The second phase was intellectual assent and indoctrination. The most powerful recruitment tool for the Huks, and the one that provided 38 percent of their recruits, was personal relationships. As with most societies, personal relationships account for most of what people do and how they act. The obligation to personal relationships in Philippine society was so strong that people would join the Huks simply because a relative or friend had become a Huk.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Benedict J Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977) 94.

<sup>71</sup> Schaff, 122.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 120.

Others were “invited” to join by armed strangers who did not always use force with new recruits but might use more subtle means, such as the foot in the door technique. One former Huk recalls that his recruitment began with a request to help the Huks carry a bag of rice into the woods. After helping the Huks carry the rice, the recruit was assimilated into the group and never returned to his barrio again. Twenty percent of the Huks were recruited in a similar manner. However, the Huks at times resorted to straight kidnapping or capture of recruits. It is estimated that 18 percent of the Huk soldiers or supporters were kidnapped.<sup>73</sup>

The education phase was very important in instilling the core ideas of the movement into the Huks new members and supporters. For some peasants, the education phase of recruitment was the first time they were exposed to the ideas of land for the landless or to communist propaganda. For these recruits it was not until after they had committed to the Huks that they learned the core concepts and became true believers in the Huk’s three core ideas: “land for the landless,” equalization of the class structure, and sympathy for the oppressed.<sup>74</sup>

Educating the masses on the core ideas of the Huk cause was of utmost importance. All propaganda centered on these three ideas that related directly to the masses of workers and peasants. Huk propaganda also targeted local and national governmental leadership, exposing the government’s lack of concern for the common people and the injustices that the government and upper classes perpetrated against the peasants and the working class. Huk propaganda also targeted government programs that had been developed to counter the Huk claims of inequality, such as the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) farms, which were farm lands given to Huk soldiers who surrendered. The Huk counterpropaganda to the establishment of the EDCOR farms was to claim that they were concentration camps.<sup>75</sup>

The various government responses and strategies for combating the Huks can be categorized by different presidential administrations prior to and during the Huk rebellion. At the beginning of the insurrection, prior to the Japanese occupation,

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<sup>73</sup> Schaff, 122.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 112.

President Manuel Quezon recognized the peasants' social unrest. However, Quezon paid the unrest little attention. The Quezon administration passed a handful of laws in the late 1930's addressing the differences between the land owners and the peasants. These laws, and a few small concessions that came under the title of the "Social Justice" program, were not intended to fix the situation but to pacify the masses. The Quezon administration also dabbled in the use of force to quell social unrest but, as with the "Social Justice" initiatives, the use of force failed to stem the unrest of the peasants and working class. Before the unrest became a full-blown peasant rebellion, the Japanese invaded and the Huks' attention turned to thwarting the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.<sup>76</sup>

After the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the first president of the Philippine Republic was President Manuel Roxas. The Huks' resentment of the government continued to grow because they were treated as outlaws rather than as forces who had contributed significantly to the liberation of the Philippines. Furthermore, Roxas and many in his administration had held offices under the Japanese during the occupation. The Huks quickly turned this into an anti-government propaganda issue, labeling the Roxas administration as traitors and collaborators. In response, Roxas proclaimed his "iron fist" policy. He insisted that he would wipe out the Huks in sixty days, and would accept only an unconditional surrender or annihilation of the Huk forces. A problem with Roxas' plan was that he was sent poorly trained, underpaid and hard-pressed government troops to eradicate a seasoned Huk guerrilla force that enjoyed the support and sympathy of the local populace. The government troops engaged in indiscriminate use of force, shelling barrios, mistreating the local populace, and purging the communities of supplies. This approach naturally strengthened local support for the Huks. The aggressive iron fist program, along with the government troops' poor performance and behavior, validated the Huk rhetoric about the government's lack of concern for peasants and the working class.<sup>77</sup>

Initially, President Elpidio Quirino's administration sought to reverse the stern military policy of his predecessor. Instead of a policy of unconditional surrender or

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<sup>76</sup> Kerkvliet, 61.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 194.



annihilation, Quirino sought to bring the Huks “into the government’s fold through conciliation and sweet reasonableness.”<sup>78</sup> The Quirino administration began negotiations with the Huks and offered Taruc, the Huk Supremo, the seat in congress that he had been denied in the previous election. The administration also established an amnesty period in which all Huks could register and turn in their weapons. However, after a few weeks of negotiations in which both sides charged the other with acting in bad faith, Taruc disappeared back into Huk controlled territory and the fighting resumed. With the failure of Roxas’ iron fist policy and now Quirino’s “velvet glove” policy, many began to doubt an end to the Huk rebellion.

The most significant event of the Quirino administration was the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND). At the time of his appointment, Magsaysay was a newcomer in the political arena. However, with his background as a commander of guerilla forces against the Japanese, Magsaysay understood the fundamentals of insurgency. After the failure of the iron fist and velvet glove policies, he and the rest of the Philippine government recognized that in the fight against the Huk rebels, the most important goal of government policy was to regain the trust of the peasant and working class. He instituted the “policy of attraction” that not only advocated dealing with the Huks justly and humanely, but also ensured proper behavior by the troops as they interacted with the local populace.

Magsaysay also understood the intelligence potential of the local populace in regards to gathering information on the Huks. Under Magsaysay’s direction, the military still maintained an aggressive posture towards Huk forces; however, they were more judicious in the use of force and avoided useless bloodshed of Huk members and supporters. In so doing, the government forces increased their popularity among the people. As government forces stopped committing abuses on villagers, the villagers began to trust the forces more. They began to provide information to the military and were less willing to give information to the Huks. Mao Tse-tung specifically addressed this concept of good behavior in his list of three rules and eight remarks for guerilla interaction with the population: all actions are subject to command, do not steal from people, be neither selfish nor unjust; replace the door when you leave the house, roll up

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<sup>78</sup>Schaff, 30.

your bedding on which you have slept, be courteous, be honest in your transactions, return what you borrow, replace what you break, do not bathe in the presence of women, do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.<sup>79</sup>

The importance of the individual soldier's behavior on the population is captured in a psychological operations case study of the Huk rebellion by Valeriano and Bohannon.<sup>80</sup> In discussing what Magsaysay "knew" about counterinsurgency, among the key elements was that in the operational area, the soldier is by far the most significant element of government contact with civilians, and every action of the soldier reflects on the government.<sup>81</sup> The core concepts of the government's attraction program were a robust psychological warfare campaign supported by effective reform measures designed to address social problems in conjunction with continued military pressure on the active guerrilla forces. The main theme of the psychological warfare (PSYOPS) campaign was to win back the trust of the people. Accordingly, the target audience for PSYOPS was as much the government forces as it was the local populace. Programs that undercut Huk propaganda by directly addressing the major issues of peasants and workers included the EDCOR farm land distribution, which provided land for the landless, and the Rice Share Tenancy Act, which provided a venue to settle tenant complaints through the Industrial Relations Courts.

The Huk rebellion began to lose the support of the people in 1951 because of their atrocities against the government and the people as well. The defining moment in the fall of the insurrection came in 1954, when Taruc surrendered to government forces. Shortly after his surrender, the Army launched vigorous and sustained drives to capture the remaining dissidents and succeeded in capturing many of Taruc's elite guard and trusted followers. The success of the government campaign against the Huks can be attributed to the simultaneous attack on the Huks on many fronts. For example, the psychological operations and land reform were important factors in ending the Huk rebellion. "Effective

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<sup>79</sup> Samuel B Griffith (translator), *Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare*. (New York N.Y.: Praeger, 1961) 112.

<sup>80</sup> Charles T. Bohannon and Napoleon D. Valeriano, "Target the Civilian," in Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 525-7-1, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1976) 441-454.

<sup>81</sup> Bohannon, 441.

counter guerilla action...so intermingles concrete useful actions, protective actions, and psychological operations that it is difficult to tell where one action leaves off and another begins.”<sup>82</sup>

An influence lesson from the Huk rebellion is the need to know and understand the issues of the people so that those issues can be effectively addressed. For the government, the first major turning point in the rebellion was the government’s recognition of the Huks’ underlying theme that had created them and led to their popular support: land reform. With this recognition, the government could take steps towards remedying the land reform issues, thus undermining the Huks’ main rallying cry to the people.

Furthermore, the need to network different organizations into one larger and stronger organization was present in the Huk rebellion prior to the Japanese occupation. “[Huk] top leaders helped to knit together local peasant groups and associations into larger and stronger peasant organizations.”<sup>83</sup> The same sentiment is expressed in the following statement about the resistance movement during the Japanese occupations.

The resistance movement that sprang up in Central Luzon was unique among those that fought back . . . the decisive element of difference lay in the strong peasant unions and organization of the people that existed before the war. It gave the movement a mass base, and made the armed forces indistinguishable from the people.<sup>84</sup>

The discipline of government forces in dealing with the population is also a key lesson from the Huk rebellion. As the government forces stopped committing abuses of villagers, the villagers began to trust the forces more and to provide information to the military; they became less willing to give information to the Huks.

In summary, the main lessons from the Huk rebellion are:

- 1) The first step is to get acquainted with the people in the sector
- 2) A soldier has three missions: operations, intelligence and psy-war, and public relations (the three-in-one plan)
- 3) Rebels recruit from social ties

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<sup>82</sup> Bohannon, 447.

<sup>83</sup> Kerkvliet, 53.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 83.

- 4) Understand and address the insurgents' main theme
- 5) Have proper management and control of local organizations and networks

## **B. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948–1960**

The so-called “Malayan Emergency” has been lauded by many as the model for conducting counter-insurgency, primarily because of the success of the British government in defeating the communist insurgency. However, as R.W. Kommer suggests, the United Kingdom and the government of Malaya made many mistakes before developing “an almost classic ‘long haul low cost’ strategy well adapted to the problem they confronted.”<sup>85</sup> The fact that the counterinsurgency approach was a “mixed strategy encompassing civil, police, military, and psychological warfare programs” was crucial to the governments’ success.

As with the Huk rebellion, the Malayan Emergency had its roots in opposition to the Japanese during World War II. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) sought to expedite the British withdrawal from Malaya in hopes of strengthening its position with the Chinese community.

The true underlying condition of the Malayan emergency was the spread of communism in Asia. The three main issues that the MCP used to rally support were discrimination against the Malayan immigrant races and primarily the ethnic Chinese, land reform, and independence from British colonial rule. However, the last issue, Malayan independence, had already been declared by the British after Malaya was liberated from Japanese occupation. Therefore, for the MCP to start a rebellion claiming that independence from British rule was their primary goal would have been counterproductive. Therefore, it can be argued that the underlying and true condition for the insurgency was primarily the spread of communism and issues within the communist party.<sup>86</sup>

Lacking a truly universal reason for revolt, the support for the MCP was limited to the Chinese minority who were mainly squatters living on the plantations at the edge

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<sup>85</sup> R.W. Kommer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1972), V

<sup>86</sup> Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971) 35

of the jungles. The early success of the MCP can be attributed to three key factors: the jungle terrain, support from the squatters, and the weakness of the early government response.

The leadership and key players within the MCP were able to devise a sound strategy and propaganda campaign for the insurgency. The group was led by General Secretary Chin Peng, a Malaysian-Chinese who spoke six languages. He joined the communist party at age eighteen. He had fought along side the British guerilla forces, Force 136, against the Japanese. His commander regarded Chin Peng as Britain's most trusted guerilla—a testament not only to his skill as a fighter but also to his character and intelligence. As party leader, he devised the core strategy for the insurgency. His significant contributions to the party came from the fact that he was well versed in the political aspects of insurgencies and Mao's teachings on peoples' uprisings.<sup>87</sup>

Lam Swee was the political commissar of the MCP, vice-president of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, and a member of the South Johore Regional Committee of the MCP. Swee became disgruntled with the way the movement was being led. For example, he was astonished to learn that MCP central committee members were living far better than others in the party. He was very outspoken about the conduct of the emergency and began to feel that his life was in danger from within the party. He surrendered to Malayan officials, probably the most significant surrender of the Emergency. He immediately began to work for the government and wrote "My Accusation,"<sup>88</sup> which was used as propaganda by the government.

Another important figure in the MCP, Osman China, also eventually surrendered and began working for the government. China ran several newspapers from deep in the jungle; he surrendered primarily due to the harsh conditions of jungle life. Because he knew many of the jungle news routes, he was instrumental in the execution of the "surrender by mail campaign."<sup>89</sup>

On the government side, Sir Edward Gent was the High Commissioner at the beginning of the emergency. Gent was credited with disregarding warnings of a

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<sup>87</sup> Barber, 29

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 113

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, 23. The surrender by mail campaign consisted of former insurgents writing letters to their friends, still active insurgents, encouraging/ inducing them to surrender.

communist uprising and was unable to communicate with key members in Malayan society because he had placed himself on a high pedestal. He was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney in 1948.<sup>90</sup>

Gurney, who eventually died in an ambush, came from a military background. He soon concluded that the war in Malaya was a war of political ideologies. He believed that on no account should the military have control of the war. Gurney's key contribution to the emergency was his decision to resettle over 600,000 Chinese squatters into what would be called "new villages." The Resettlement Policy was the key in successfully separating the insurgents from their source of support. The concept was to move the squatters to "new villages" where they would be given land, education, and medical care, along with other government assistance. A home guard would also be developed to protect the "new villages" from the insurgents.

Although well-suited for the job, Gurney recognized the need for an individual whose focus would be strictly to direct and coordinate the operations against the insurgents. The person selected as the Director of Operations was the distinguished retired general Sir Harold Briggs. He also felt that the emergency was more of a police and political affair than a military operation, and believed the key to success was to control the squatters who were the primary support for the guerrillas. One of his main contributions in the Emergency was to insist on joint thinking and coordination of effort at all levels with all of the agencies involved, civilian and military.<sup>91</sup>

The Briggs plan has been lauded as the overall strategy that led to the British and Malaya government's success against the MCP. It encompassed a variety of programs and was defined by four tenets. The first was to dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security there, which would eventually result in a steady and increasing flow of information from all sources. The second tenet was to break up the communist organization within populated areas. The third tenet was to isolate the bandits (communist terrorist) from their food and information supply organizations which were

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<sup>90</sup> Barber, 65.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 93.

in the populated areas. The last tenet was to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the government forces on the government's own ground.<sup>92</sup>

The first "Supremo" of the emergency was Sir Gerald Templar, whose role was to prepare the country for independence and rid the country of communism. With his intelligence background, Templar saw the emergency as an intelligence war. He focused on establishing an intelligence gathering network and utilizing the police intelligence unit, the Special Branch.<sup>93</sup>

The Malayan government's psychological warfare expert was C. C. Too. He had a detailed knowledge of the communist party and how to deal with the communist mindset. Prior to the Emergency, he had attended communist meetings and, because of his academic prowess, was invited (but declined) to join the party. Too developed the emergency's psychological warfare philosophy. The first tenet of his philosophy was to understand the different personality types within the communist party which he classified as the sincere communist, the wavier, and the criminal. The next tenet was to ensure that the concepts and messages fit every kind of communist terrorist. He developed "Too's Rules": Don't preach, don't theorize, never say "I told you so," and don't use propaganda based on hatred. The importance of Too's role in the Malaysian Emergency, as summarized in the following quote from Richard Clutterbuck: "It took us some time to learn the obvious lesson that psychological warfare must be directed by a local man. It is amazing how many Europeans think they understand the Asian mind."<sup>94</sup>

The organization of the MCP involved two distinct categories: the strike force and the support group. These forces were arrayed regionally throughout Malaya. The strike force derived from the former Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Party, which had fought alongside British guerrillas. In the beginning, they had access to caches of weapons and equipment that had been airdropped by the British to support guerilla warfare against the Japanese because of their connection with the British guerilla forces.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> During the emergency the British and Malayan official referred to the insurgent by several names. The initial term used was "bandits" it was later change to "communist terrorist (CT)." In this chapter "bandits=CT=insurgent."

<sup>93</sup> Barber, 152.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 118. Richard Clutterbuck served on the Director of Operations staff in Kuala Lumpur and is the author of *The Long, Long War*

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 31.

As the war ended and insurgency began, the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese party transitioned to the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Party. The strike force's main philosophy was to strike swiftly with murder and terror. The support group for the strike force was called the Min Yuen. The Min Yuen consisted primarily of Chinese squatters and villagers on the outskirts of the jungle who provided logistical support for the strike force and also operated as an intelligence organization. The Min Yuen was clandestine, formal and highly efficient.<sup>96</sup>

The government also had a strike force, the Ferret Force, made up of small teams of British, Gurkha, and Malay soldiers. These small teams, trained in "bush craft" and jungle warfare, constituted a small part of the organization that combated the insurgency. The main body of the government counter-insurgency organization was the State War Executive Committee (SWEC) and the District War Executive Committees (DWEC). These committees were truly an interagency task force. The committees were headed by civilians, with attached military liaisons with authority to act on time-sensitive intelligence. This interagency task force structure proved to be the key in the successful coordination and implantation of the Briggs plan.<sup>97</sup>

General Chin Peng's strategy for the conduct of the insurrection was constructed in three phases. The first phase—the harassment phase—was designed to cripple the British planters and tin miners while increasing guerilla strength through the capture of arms and equipment from police posts. Conducting small actions against civilian targets and isolated police posts discredited the government and the police and enhanced the guerrillas' image. The second phase—the restricting phase—was meant to drive government security forces from the countryside. This phase would lead directly to the final phase—the liberated territory phase—which was to be the establishment and expansion of liberated areas in insurgent controlled territory. The expansion of the liberated areas was to continue until the insurgents controlled all of Malaya.<sup>98</sup>

Chin Peng's strategy had only a few basic requirements: security, intelligence, rice, weapons and ammunition. For example, the MCP implemented a campaign of terror

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<sup>96</sup> Barber, 32.

<sup>97</sup> John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954* (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1992), 84.

<sup>98</sup> Barber, 33.



in response to the government's National Registration program. The National Registration Program was intended to provide an accurate account of everyone in the country, including, most importantly, the squatters. It also served as the basis for a rationing and population control system which allowed the government to utilize the carrot and the stick approach as well as to restrict the movements of the insurgents. The MCP campaign of terror was marked by attacks on the registration teams and the burning of registration cards taken from the people. Osman China, the MCP's propaganda expert, devised a brilliant propaganda plan countering the government's registration program. He claimed that the program was a prelude to conscription, would make it easier for the government to levy taxes, and that it was a tyrannous enforcement of fascist methods devised to consolidate control of the people.<sup>99</sup>

The government's overall strategy was based on several key ideas, the first being the realization that this emergency should not be primarily a military action. Second, to win against the guerrillas would require separating them from their support base and forcing them to attack on the government's terms. From these key ideas came the National Registration Program, the Resettlement Policy, the SWEC and DWEC, as well as the Briggs Plan.

Another aspect of the Malaya Emergency that contributed to the success of the government was the fact that the British maintained military units in the country for multiple tours. They also benefited from the expertise of the British and Malayan civil servants with years of local experience. This provided the British with a wealth of institutional experience and knowledge. This institutional knowledge, along with the assistance of several key Malaysians, proved useful in intelligence activities and the psychological campaign.

The government's psychological campaign had three aims: to encourage surrender, sow dissension between insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders, and to create an image of the government (both to the insurgents and to the population) as firm, efficient, fair and generous. The primary means of communication used for the psychological war (PSYWAR) was radio (in 12 languages), jungle leaflets, and voice aircraft. However, the cause of a large number of surrenders was the personal contact and

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<sup>99</sup> Barber, 75.

relations between those who had already surrendered and the fighters still in the jungle as in the case of the surrender by mail campaign.<sup>100</sup>

Malaya became a sovereign independent state on August 31, 1957.<sup>101</sup> This had a tremendous effect on the insurrection. Although the MCP had already withered to fewer than two thousand active fighters as a result of the counterinsurgency efforts thus far, Malaysia's independence took away their primary goal of liberation from British rule. The new government continued to use aggressive military action, PSYOPS, and monetary rewards to bring an end to the emergency. The result was a number of mass surrenders by the communist terrorist. The Malayan Emergency was declared ended on July 31, 1960.<sup>102</sup>

One lesson from the Malayan emergency in regards to influence, psychological operations and counterinsurgency, is the importance of accurate intelligence. As Komer notes, "In the early days of the Emergency good intelligence was a sometime thing . . . Briggs noted the lack of intelligence as a key weakness and stressed improvement."<sup>103</sup> More specifically, the Malay case points to the importance of recognizing the type of intelligence needed and determining the primary agency responsible for intelligence collection in an unconventional environment. Kitson suggests that the adversary's inherent mode of operation provides very little information that can be collected or acted upon. Furthermore, military intelligence organizations are not geared for this type of intelligence collection.

The sort of information required cannot, except on rare occasions, be provide on a plate by anyone, not even by the intelligence organization. If there was a system whereby the intelligence organization could do this, it would have been devised years ago and there would be no such thing as insurgency because enemy armed groups and their supporters would at once be found, harried, tracked down and destroyed by the army and the police.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Barber, 119.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 257.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, 271.

<sup>103</sup> Komer, 43.

<sup>104</sup> Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations; Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (Harrisburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1972) 95.

Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker also supports the idea that the military intelligence organization is not best suited for collection in this type of environment. In his reasoning on why “military intelligence should be the servant and not the master of the special branch,” he writes,

It is for the simple reason that the special branch officers and their staffs, and their agents, live in the country, speak the language and know the people. Indeed they are of the people, whereas army intelligence staffs are here today and gone tomorrow and are continually rotating.<sup>105</sup>

Another key lesson in influence from the Malayan Emergency can be found in the information campaign headed by A. D. C Peterson.<sup>106</sup> Peterson recognized the correlation between an information campaign having something to sell and the most reliable way to sell, which is face to face contact. The product he was selling was nationalism and the vessels that carried the message were “progressive young men who, after a six week course, would go out into the villages and preach nationalism, using well equipped mobile vans with a variety of equipment.”<sup>107</sup> The efforts of the face to face contact techniques implemented by Peterson were reinforced by movies, radio, newspapers, and press releases all tailored to (or at least in the local vernacular of) the target audience. Two more lessons appear from this. It is necessary to reinforce messages introduced at the local level with supporting mass media themes. Further, messages must be tailored to target audiences and presented in a manner that will be understood by the masses.

The main lessons from the Malayan emergency are these:

- 1) The importance of intelligence and understanding UW intelligence
- 2) Different types of intelligence require the right type of intelligence force
- 3) Indigenous people should be involved in developing and executing the PSYOP campaign
- 4) Face to face contact is critical

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<sup>105</sup> Kitson, 1

<sup>106</sup> Komer, 70. Peterson was brought in by Templar in 1952 to head the information and PSYWAR campaign. Peterson had PSYWAR experience in South East Asia in World War II.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 70.

- 5) Reinforcing nature of PSYOP at all levels along with information and reward programs
- 6) Messages should be tailored to their audiences

### **C. CONCLUSION**

The cases studies examined in this chapter reveal several key lessons in regards to influence in a UW environment. Some of the key lessons include the concept of intelligence in the UW environment, the importance of face to face contact, use of organizations and networks, as well as the effects of the conditions of the environment on an influence campaign. These lessons, along with the concepts discussed in Chapter II, are used to develop a grassroots influence model in Chapter IV.

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## **IV. A MODEL OF GRASSROOTS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

This chapter develops a grassroots psychological model (GRP) based on the principles and techniques of influence derived from the materials discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The GRP model is intended for use by specially trained forces in a UW environment. Several existing discussions are used as guidelines for framing the GRP model, including William McRaven's relative superiority model (six principles of special operations) and Basilici and Simmons' principles of unconventional warfare.

The chapter begins with an introduction to the relative superiority model followed by the principles of UW. The last section of the chapter proposes the principles for a grassroots psychological operations model, and categorizes various techniques and elements according to their usefulness to the principles of GRP.

### **A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY**

An influential model for special operations is the relative superiority model. McRaven says that "relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well defended enemy."<sup>108</sup>

The concept of relative superiority has three basic properties. The first property is that "relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement."<sup>109</sup> The pivotal moment may precede combat; the conditions may be such that once things are set in motion, nothing the enemy can do will change the outcome. Applying this to the concept of influence in the UW environment, and substituting the target audience for the idea of the enemy, this pivotal moment is the tipping point. The pivotal moment—tipping point—then becomes dependent on both the physical size of the area of operations and the size of the population. For instance, if the target area is a town, then the number of people within that target audience who must be influenced for the UW forces to gain relative superiority is far smaller than if the target area were a large city. Achieving relative superiority requires that Special Forces have the ability to influence the masses.

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<sup>108</sup> William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) 4.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, 4

Furthermore, “once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee victory.”<sup>110</sup> This also holds true in the UW environment, as evidenced by the Huks’ ability to maintain influence over the people. The Huks initially gained relative superiority in comparison to the government’s lack of control and legitimacy, but they could not maintain relative superiority and thus were not victorious in the end. Also, in the Malayan Emergency the MCP achieved relative superiority with the squatters but could not maintain their status when the Resettlement Policy separated insurgents from their source of relative superiority.

The third property of relative superiority is “if relative superiority is lost it is difficult to regain.”<sup>111</sup> Once the Philippines government overcame the Huks’ relative superiority they were able to defeat the insurgents. In the Malayan Emergency, it was much easier for the government to overcome the MCP’s relative superiority because the MCP had only gained relative superiority among a small portion of the population, the ethnic Chinese. Once both insurgent groups lost relative superiority over their population base they were never able to regain it.

McRaven provides a visual depiction of the three properties of relative superiority. The same ideas are applicable to grassroots psychological operations in UW.<sup>112</sup>




Figure 5. Sample Relative Superiority Graph<sup>113</sup>

<sup>110</sup> McRaven, 5

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 6

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>113</sup> McRaven, 7.

The pivotal moment can be seen as a dramatic rise in the probability of mission success. Sustaining relative superiority and maintaining influence over the population are depicted as a gradual rise from the tipping point to mission success. In the UW environment the X-axis, time, will be measured in months or years, as it may take that long to gain relative superiority; time depends also on the size of the area of operation. The intersection of the X and Y-axis is the point of vulnerability (PV). In the UW environment, the PV is defined as the first contact between the Special Forces and the population, when the reaction of the population is unknown so the frictions of war (chance, uncertainty, and the will of the people) have an increased impact on the success of the mission.<sup>114</sup> The gray area, the area of vulnerability (AV), is a function of mission completion over time. “The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area of vulnerability, hence the greater the impact of the frictions of war.” The same applies to the unconventional warfare environment: the longer it takes to gain relative superiority the more impact chance, uncertainty and the will of the people will have on the mission. The relative superiority model is a visual depiction on how the frictions of war and time affect a grassroots psychological operation. It is useful to the GRP model in that it allows planners and operators to conceptualize and analyze a GRP before, during and after the operation.

The six principles of special operations, like the concept of relative superiority, are focused on direct action, but some are relevant to UW and GRP as well. Only those directly relevant to UW and GRP are discussed below. The six principles of special operations are: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.<sup>115</sup> *Spec Ops* situates the principles within the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation, and execution.<sup>116</sup> This same framework is used later in this chapter for organizing the principles of GRP in an UW environment.

### **1. Planning Phase: Simplicity**

Simplicity is the only relevant principle in the planning phase. It is characterized by three elements: limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation.

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<sup>114</sup> McRaven, 8.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 9.



Limiting the number of objectives for GRP means defining specific, vital actions or beliefs that one hopes to influence the target audience into doing or believing. The intent is to adjust, reshape, or mold the perceptual framework so that indigenous people's views and actions are compatible with short term tactical and long term strategic goals.

Chapter II notes that compliance professionals in the persuasion industry have very limited and specific objectives. They focus on discovering what information would most likely influence the target audience and how to tailor that information to improve the influence attempt. In the Philippines, Magsaysay's psychological campaign had three linked objectives change the behavior of government troops in order to increase the government's legitimacy and thereby increase defection from the guerrillas. This case exemplifies how interrelated and codependent objectives may be crucial to mission success. Determining and limiting the actions one wants from the target audience is the first priority of the planning process. Limiting objectives narrows the scope of the strategic goal and allows planners to focus on a nested multilayer approach to the mission in order to coordinate and synchronize grassroots psychological operations with the supporting mass media propaganda and public diplomacy. For example, in the Malayan emergency, the major factor of influence at the tactical level was face to face personal contact with the target audience. The messages delivered in these contacts were reinforced by other means, but without face to face contact, those other messages would be merely enemy propaganda.<sup>117</sup>

Another aspect of limiting objectives in a large scale UW operation is determining what areas of the population to focus on—which areas will produce the biggest bang for the buck as a high value target areas (HVTA), which town, city, or region is more susceptible to influence? Which would have the greatest chance of creating a cascade effect? As Krebs' rules suggest, the community most ripe for influence is one predisposed to favor your objectives, or a neutral battleground area without majority support for the enemy—but these areas are also the least likely to generate a cascading

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<sup>117</sup> Given the UW is defined as a broad spectrum of activities, Limiting Objectives in this context refers to the amount of strategic objectives, geographical area and population one GRP force can effectively manage. It is also important to note that limiting objectives does not imply limiting the tactics and activities employed by the GRP force.

affect. In contrast, areas where the population is predisposed to support the enemy may have the greatest potential to generate the desired cascading effect.<sup>118</sup>

A second element of simplicity is good intelligence. Good intelligence in the GRP model is distinctly different than good intelligence for direct action missions, specifically because the focus is on the target audience rather than on the enemy's capabilities. In the GRP model, intelligence is more clearly tied to the concept of indirect intelligence, which is information gathered on a specific community that provides GRP operators and planners with detailed information on the individuals, networks, emotions, motives and objective reasoning of that community. Chapter Two describes how the persuasion industry focuses its research on the target audience rather than on competitors' capabilities. In the Malayan Emergency, the initial focus of intelligence was the target audience. As with intelligence requirements for any type of special operations, the indirect intelligence requirements should be narrow and in-depth, specific and detailed, so the operator can fully exploit the advantages of indirect intelligence at the tactical level. In other words thorough intelligence on the target audience will increase the initial effectiveness of the GRP force.

Intelligence on the key issues used in the opposition's propaganda is vital for preparing a counterpoint and giving operators a sense of their target audience. As noted in the discussion of McAdam's research, the individual recruitment process is more effective in the absence of negative influence. Knowledge of the negative influences increases operators' ability to counter them. Unlike the persuasion industry, planners for operations in UW environments probably will not have access to the intended target audience prior to the mission, which limits information-gathering. However, intelligence is an ongoing process and with the protracted nature of UW, the SF force can develop the detailed information required for the effective application of the GRP model once on the ground--as opposed to the need for detailed intelligence prior to a short duration direct action mission, where the operators do not have the time to develop or gather intelligence.

Nonetheless, it is imperative that the planners use innovative ways to gather information, such as analyzing the local media or consulting with people in neighboring

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<sup>118</sup> Krebs, 6.

countries and immigrants from a particular region to the US. Innovation, the third element of simplicity, is valuable because it “simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and or complicate the rapid execution of the mission.”<sup>119</sup> One obstacle in the application of the GRP model is the one just discussed—the problem of getting detailed information on the target audience. “Innovation is normally manifested in new technology, but it is also the application of unconventional tactics.”<sup>120</sup> In this sense, innovation is an integral and inherent part of GRP.

## **2. Preparation Phase: Security and Familiarization**

For the grassroots psychological operations model, the preparation phase consists of security and thorough familiarization with detailed information on the target audience.<sup>121</sup> In the preparation phase, security is a key principle of direct action special operations. Security in the UW environment remains relevant in the same way as for direct action: “The purpose of tight security is to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack [UW mission].”<sup>122</sup> For example, the enemy in UW may be successful in desensitizing the population to the GRP operators long before their arrival. Creating population immunity to the special operator’s message makes the influence process harder and increases the time to achieve relative superiority, thus increasing the special operators’ area of vulnerability. More likely and with greater consequences for the GRP force, the enemy may increase their control of the target area such that the operation cannot be conducted. Because UW is inherently covert, clandestine and politically sensitive, such missions must be protected and secure to insure the political will to support them.

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<sup>119</sup> McRaven, 13.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>121</sup> Replacing repetition with familiarization represents the significant difference between the quantifiable and demonstrable state of readiness in the critical task of direct action special operations and the theoretical and imperceptible state of readiness in the critical tasks of unconventional warfare. This distinct difference is what I believe to be the main reason for the general military’s affinity for direct action and their lack of affinity and political will to conduct unconventional warfare

<sup>122</sup> McRaven, 14.

A similar concept to the principle of repetition that is relevant in preparing for a GRP mission is a thorough familiarization with intelligence on the target audience.<sup>123</sup> Familiarization should include interaction with people from the area of operation or from a similar background. As with the persuasion industry, familiarization will allow operators to develop profiles of the target audience and mold their message appropriately. Familiarization will also provide operators with a sense of what to expect, potential problem areas, possible counters to their message, and the information needed to help establish a favorable climate for their influence attempt utilizing the principles of “landscaping” and “pre-persuasion” discussed in Chapter II.

### **3. Execution Phase: Speed/Timing and Purpose**

Because the focus of grassroots psychological operations is the target audience, the special operation principle of surprise, or “catching the enemy off guard,”<sup>124</sup> is not directly relevant to the unconventional warfare environment. However, the timing of implementation can make a significant difference in the outcome, as was suggested in the discussion of social proof as a weapon of influence. Social proof is most effective in times of uncertainty and confusion, and a GRP operation can create or take advantage of uncertainty and confusion through landscaping or pre-persuasion. The operators’ security and the achievement of relative superiority depends more on how quickly the operators establish a positive relationship with the target audience, suggest Basilici and Simmons, who note that “UW operators gain their best security when friendly indigenous personnel are around them.”<sup>125</sup> This and other factors make speed a necessary principle of the GRP model.

In the GRP model, as with the direct action special operations model, the underlying reason for speed—to reduce the area of vulnerability and increase the chance of gaining relative superiority—is exactly the same. In the GRP model, however, speed and timing are critical to establishing a positive relationship with the target audience.

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<sup>123</sup>The second principle in the preparation phase, repetition, refers to rehearsals to increase the odds of success. Repetition is not relevant in the UW environment, because those tasks most critical to successful influence are not subject to rehearsal—tasks like establishing relationships and rapport, identifying key personnel, co-opting or establishing networks, and message delivery.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 17.

<sup>125</sup> Steven P Basilici and Jeremy Simmons. *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare* (Monterey CA.: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 57.

The importance of speed and timing are to protect the security of the operators and to take advantage of an uncertain situation so they can get a “foot in the door.” Speed and timing are also important in the transition from “power authority” to “sovereign authority.” The faster the GRP operators can transition from power authority to sovereign authority, the lower the likelihood of a backlash or resentment in the target audience. Speed and timing are also relevant to the GRP in relation to initiating the processes of “emergent mobilization” and “scale shift” discussed in chapter II. The relative superiority line lies somewhere in the vicinity of these two processes, and the faster the GRP operators can get to these processes, the faster they will have achieved relative superiority.

Purpose, as it relates to direct action missions, is “understanding and then executing the prime objective of mission regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities.”<sup>126</sup> The concept translates exactly the same in the UW environment and as a principle for GRP. The two requirements of purpose, that it be clearly defined in the mission statement and that it involves personal commitment, hold true in the GRP model. The clearly defined purpose in the GRP model refers to the specific actions you want the target audience to take in support of the mission’s objectives. Having the purpose clearly defined in the mission statement insures that the GRP operator understands the overall objective and allows the operator, in the face of changing circumstances, to use ingenuity in successfully completing the mission. With the decentralized nature of Special Forces operations in a UW environment (more so than in a DA mission), a clearly stated purpose is invaluable. Personal commitment is also more valuable in a UW mission and for GRP than in a DA mission because of the inherent frictions of UW. For example, the psychological impacts on the GRP operator are not present for the DA operator. The mission’s long duration and isolation, the relatively slow feedback, the effects of the physical environment and harsh living conditions—all can have a negative impact on the operator’s mental health. Therefore, a strong sense of purpose that leads to personal commitment can help sustain the GRP operator for the duration of the mission.

In summary, drawing from the discussion in the preceding chapters, the concepts contributing to relative superiority and the six principles of special operations, with slight

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<sup>126</sup> McRaven, 21.

modification, apply to the grassroots psychological operations model for the UW environment. It is clear that the relative superiority paradigm can be applied to GRP and UW with the understanding that the protracted nature of UW significantly lengthens the time axis. As for the six principles of special operation, in the planning phase the principle of simplicity is relevant to GRP as it advocates limiting objectives (actions to be taken by the target audience and determining the HVTA), good intelligence (indirect intelligence), and innovation. In the preparation phase, security has the same purpose for GRP as it does for direct action missions. Thorough familiarization with the target audience is more important than repetition for GRP missions in the UW environment. In the execution phase, speed and timing are relevant to the GRP model, given the understanding that for GRP, speed and timing pertain to the establishment of positive relationships, transition between the types of authority and initiation of the processes of emergent mobilization and scale shift. The principle of purpose translates directly from the special operations model to the GRP model and may even have a greater impact as it pertains to personal commitment in a UW environment.

## **B. THE PRINCIPLES OF UW**

In the absence of specific principles of unconventional warfare, Basilici and Simmons developed a set of UW principles derived from their analysis of the principles of military operations other than war.<sup>127</sup> Given that grassroots psychological operations are intended for use in the UW environment, it is relevant to analyze the applicability of these principles to the GRP model. It is important to note that success in a UW environment requires a mix of both direct and indirect means. The focus of GRP is on indirect means to accomplish given objectives. It will work in support of the overall unconventional warfare paradigm. Basilici and Simmons propose five principles of UW: overlapping objectives, decontrol, restraint, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy. Of these, three are relevant to GRP efforts: overlapping objectives, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Basilici and Simmons, 57.

<sup>128</sup> Basilici, 61. Although the idea of “decontrol” should be a prerequisite for the execution of a UW mission, its impact on influencing the target audience is minimal at most. Similarly, the utility and applicability of “restraint” as a principle of the GRP model is small. However, the restraint principle has utility as a justification for and validation of grassroots psychological operations non-kinetic approach.

Overlapping objectives is the idea that “US military objectives must overlap with the indigenous force’s political objectives.”<sup>129</sup> Basilici and Simmons suggest that if the objectives are not congruent, it would be extremely difficult for the US to achieve its military objectives. Several of the concepts presented thus far in this thesis support the UW principle of overlapping objectives. In discussing influence, market researcher Frank Luntz suggests that “it doesn’t matter what you want to tell the public, it’s about what they want to hear.”<sup>130</sup> This demonstrates the requirement to understand the needs or objectives of the target audience. In both the Philippine and Malayan cases, the insurgents’ themes appealed to their target audiences and thus they gained needed support from the people. In both cases, when the government recognized and addressed the needs and objectives of the people, they won back popular support. Having overlapping objectives is essential to influencing the target audience, with one caveat. As the commitment and consistency weapon of influence from Chapter II suggests, overlapping objectives is only crucial in gaining the initial commitment; after that, the target audience will develop internal motivations to remain consistent with their commitment.

Perseverance, as a principle, “is best understood in the context that UW operations take time to develop.”<sup>131</sup> This holds true for GRP and is important enough to be a principle of GRP. The ability to sustain the operation in a UW environment is paramount to mission accomplishment as demonstrated by the time spans in which the Huk rebellion and the Malayan Emergency took place.

Fostering legitimacy suggests that UW operations with legitimacy have a better chance of long term success. This principle supports the implications of the need to transition from power authority to sovereign authority as quickly as possible. This thesis asserts that the transition between the types of authorities is a critical step to maintaining relative superiority in the UW environment. Once the transition (which may be transparent) is accomplished, the probability of influencing the target audience will increase as the probability of rejection decreases. Legitimacy increases the effects of the

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<sup>129</sup> Basilici, 61.

<sup>130</sup> Goodman and Rushkoff, *The Persuaders*.

<sup>131</sup> Basilici, 61

weapons of influence of “authority,” “liking,” and “social proof,” and it aids in creating a relationship with the target audience. Legitimacy is a relevant principle for the GRP model.

To summarize, from the work of Basilici and Simmons on principles of UW, one can derive three principles relevant to the grassroots psychological model: overlapping objectives, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy.

### **C. A MODEL OF GRASSROOTS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

The models discussed above—relative superiority (six principles of special operations) and three of the five principles of unconventional warfare—along with concepts and principles discussed in earlier chapters provide the foundation for the following model of grassroots psychological operations. Because GRP operations are planned, not spontaneous, the model is organized in three phases: the planning, preparation, and execution phases.

#### **1. Planning Phase**

The planning phase involves two principles: simplicity and overlapping objectives.

- 1) The Principle of Simplicity. This principle involves three elements. The first is to limit the number of objectives or actions to be taken by the target audience. The second is good intelligence, which aids in determining the high value target areas of operations. Indirect intelligence is information gathered on a specific community that provides detailed information on the individuals, networks, emotions, motives and objective reasoning of that community. The third element, innovation, aids in avoiding or eliminating obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and or would complicate the rapid execution of the mission.
- 2) The Principle of Overlapping Objectives. The GRP objectives must overlap with the target audience’s needs, interest and objectives.

#### **2. Preparation Phase**

The preparation phase also requires attention to two principles: security and familiarization.

- 3) The Principle of Security is defined as preventing the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending UW mission.



- 4) The Principle of Familiarization prescribes a thorough familiarization with intelligence on the target audience. Familiarization should include as much interaction as possible with indigenous people from the area of operation.

### 3. Execution Phase

The execution phase involves four principles: relative speed, fostering legitimacy, perseverance, and purpose.

- 5) The Principle of Relative Speed and timing are defined as the time it will take to establish positive relationships, transition from power authority to sovereign authority, and initiate the processes of mobilization and scale shift.
- 6) The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy involves conveying to the target audience that the overlapping objectives are well-reasoned and sincere, and that these objectives are pursued under sovereign authority.
- 7) The Principle of Perseverance entails understanding the long duration of UW. Operators involved with GRP operations must have the wherewithal to overcome adversity if they hope to succeed in these long-term missions.
- 8) The Principle of Purpose requires having a clearly defined purpose that is related to the specific actions you want the target audience to take in support of the objectives of the mission. The principle of purpose allows the operator, in the face of changing circumstances, to use ingenuity in successfully completing the mission.

Principles of Grassroots Psychological Operations				
PLANNING PHASE				
<i>Simplicity</i>			<i>Overlapping Objectives</i>	
Limited objectives		Good intelligence	Innovation	
TA Actions	HVTA			
PREPARATION PHASE				
<i>Security</i>		<i>Familiarization</i>		
		Intelligence	Interaction	
EXECUTION PHASE				
<i>Speed</i>		<i>Legitimacy</i>	<i>Perseverance</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
Establish relationships	Transition	Mobilization/Scale shift		

Table 1. Principles of Grassroots Psychological Operations

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

These eight principles will be useful to UW planners and the operators that work in an environment where indirect means of influence are extremely important to the accomplishment of the mission objectives. More importantly, understanding the underlying elements and techniques that shaped the eight principles will allow the UW specialist to adapt them to the ever changing environment and cultural context of unconventional warfare.

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## **V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. SUMMARY**

This thesis investigates the art of influence and how non-lethal influence techniques can be used by SF in a UW environment. The intent is to provide a document that planners and operators can use to guide and improve their probability of success in influencing the target audience in a manner less likely to produce blowback and more likely to have lasting effects. The product of the research is eight principles of grassroots psychological (GRP) operations. Given the nature of the conflicts and threats faced by the United States today, continued research on the art of influence and its military applications will be invaluable to UW operators and planners.

The research is based on several premises introduced in Chapter I. These include the strategic utility of Special Forces and its historic link to UW and PSYOPS, the importance of the contested population, the problem of blowback from direct means of control, and the importance of understanding the art of influence and the psychological factors that contribute to successful influence attempts in the UW environment.

Chapter II assumed that mass media and propaganda are not as effective at influencing people as is face to face contact. This chapter defined the “hearts and minds” problem and introduced the concentric circles of influence. Most importantly, the chapter surveyed the commercial, political and academic research of cognitive and social psychology on techniques and principles for influencing human behavior, outlining many techniques and principles for influencing individuals, as well as the influence impact of social networks. Many of the influence techniques and elements described in this chapter support the overarching principles of the GRP model.

Because unconventional warfare is a form of war, environmental factors will naturally affect the art of influence. Therefore, Chapter III presented two case studies of influence in unconventional warfare environments: the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. The analysis found that some of the elements of influence were consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter, while other elements were specific to the unconventional warfare environment. Among the most significant elements of influence are soldiers’ (positive) interactions with the target audience, efforts

to counter the opponents' theme, the intelligence organization's focus, involving the indigenous people in the GRP operation, and the need to coordinate levels and types of influence, information operations, and propaganda to be mutually supporting and reinforcing.

To situate the elements of influence within a comprehensible and applicable model, Chapter IV analyzed those elements in the context of two established models: one focused on direct action special operations and one on unconventional warfare.

The principles of grassroots psychological operations derived from this analysis are placed in a three-phase model (planning, preparation, and execution). The eight principles are:

- 1) The Principle of Simplicity
- 2) The Principle of Overlapping Objectives
- 3) The Principle of Security
- 4) The Principle of Familiarization
- 5) The Principle of Relative Speed
- 6) The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy
- 7) The Principle of Perseverance
- 8) The Principle of Purpose

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLICATION**

The GRP model is intended to work in conjunction with or in support of other models that encompass the entire spectrum of activities in an UW conflict.<sup>132</sup> The primary beneficiaries of this model will be those who habitually operate in UW environments, namely Special Forces. This author recommends that, at minimum, a block of instruction in the art of influence and grassroots psychological operations be established for UW operators as a part of their qualification training. Such a course should present, in detail, the underlying elements of cognitive and social psychology that impact the influence process. In addition, this training should be developed to accompany cultural awareness training.

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<sup>132</sup> One example is the "Mystic Diamond," a model developed by Professor Gordon McCormick and presented in his 2005 Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School).

### **C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

This thesis introduced eight principles of grassroots psychological operations, which are elements of influence relevant to unconventional warfare. To validate or refine the model, using the GRP model to assess additional historical UW cases would be useful. Another area for future research is a comparison of the GRP model to current psychological operations. Also, the development of a GRP critical task list derived from the principles and techniques developed in this thesis would be invaluable to UW planners and operators. Finally, a GRP influence index that would estimate the probability of an influence attempt's success is worth researching, and would be a relevant and useful tool in the UW environment.

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